Chapter 26: Environmental Law by Johnson, Richard H. & Del Vecchio, Suzanne
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law
Volume 1970 Article 29
1-1-1970
Chapter 26: Environmental Law
Richard H. Johnson
Suzanne Del Vecchio
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml
Part of the Environmental Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Johnson, Richard H. and Del Vecchio, Suzanne (1970) "Chapter 26: Environmental Law," Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law: Vol.
1970, Article 29.
CHAPTER 26 
Environmental Law 
RICHARD H. JOHNSON and SUZANNE DEL VECCHIO 
§26.1. Introduction. A bill submitted by Governor Sargent in 
the 1969-1970 session of the Massachusetts legislature, which would 
have created a private right of action for "damage to the environ-
ment," defined that term as follows: 
"Damage to the environment" shall mean any significant im-
pairment, actual or likely, to physical features of natural, his-
torical or residential value to the Commonwealth or its citizens 
including, without limitation, air, water or noise pollution, or 
the impairment of parks, recreation facilities, open spaces, natural 
areas or natural resources, or the impairment of natural or man-
made places of historic interest, or the impairment of residential 
neighborhoods.t 
This definition highlights one of the fundamental facts about "en-
vironmental law": the difficulty of defining its scope. Certainly there 
are very few lawyers practicing in Massachusetts today who would 
consider themselves "environmental lawyers." Nonetheless, there are 
probably a great many lawyers in Massachusetts who have been in-
volved with some form of environmental law simply because our 
physical environment can be affected in so many ways and under so 
many different circumstances. Some familiar situations in which a 
lawyer may be called upon to help resolve issues affecting the environ-
ment include application of the zoning and subdivision laws, eminent 
domain proceedings, the issuance of permits or licenses to carry on 
particular businesses, and actions for nuisance. The following de-
cisions of the Supreme Judicial Court, all handed down within the 
past two years, illustrate the recurrent interaction of the law with 
environmental problems. 
In Framingham v. Department of Public Utilities,2 the Boston 
RicHARD H. JoHNSON is associated with the firm of Bingham, Dana and Gould, 
Boston, and is Chairman of the Environment Committee of the Boston Bar As· 
sociation. 
SuzANNE DEL VECCHIO is assistant corporation counsel for the city of Boston and 
attorney for the Boston Air Pollution Control Committee. 
Mr. Johnson wrote §§12.1 through 12.5 and Mrs. Del Vecchio wrote §12.6. 
§26.1. 1 Essentially the same definition of environmental damage appears in a 
Michigan statute which became effective in June, 1970. See Mich. Stat. Ann. 
§§14.528(201) et seq. (1969). 
2 !155 Mass. 138, 244 N.E.2d 281 (1969). 
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Edison Company sought an exemption under G.L., c. 40A, §10, from 
applicable zoning restrictions in order to construct a line for the 
transmission of electricity on towers between the cities of Medway 
and Sudbury. A decision of the Department of Public Utilities ap-
proving the line was upheld by the Supreme Judicial Court over 
the objections of several towns (l) that the cost of an underground 
line was justified to prevent aesthetic damage, and (2) that there was 
potential damage to the health of persons residing near the proposed 
line. In Hume v. Building Inspector of Westford} the Court held 
that a building inspector could be compelled by mandamus to en-
force a local zoning law against the plaintiff's neighbor so as to 
eliminate an overly noisy dog kennel. In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Board of 
Appeals of Framingham/ a decision of a local board of appeals deny-
ing the plaintiff a special permit to construct a gasoline station was 
sustainep, the Court holding that, even though the building of a 
station might not adversely affect the status of the neighborhood at 
the time of the application, the board was entitled to consider the 
possible adverse effect of a station upon future development in the 
area. In Robbins v. Department of Public Works,5 the Department of 
Public Works was required, upon a petition for mandamus brought 
by a group of private citizens, to prevent the transfer of certain 
parcels of public land "of natural beauty" to part of an interstate 
highway system on the ground that explicit legislation authorizing 
the diversion of the land to this use did not exist. MacGibbon v. Board 
of Appeals of Duxbury6 held that a local board of appeals could not 
refuse a permit to excavate and fill certain wetlands owned by the 
plaintiff simply on the ground that the wetlands should be preserved 
in their natural state. The Court stated that 
. . . the preservation of privately owned land in its natural, 
unspoiled state for the enjoyment and benefit of the public by 
preventing the owner from using it for any practical purpose is 
not within the scope and limits of any power or authority dele-
gated to municipalities under the Zoning Enabling Act.7 
There was a flurry of legislative activity in connection with the 
environment in the 1970 session. Major bills were passed in the areas 
of water pollution,s solid waste disposal,9 air pollution10 and pesti-
cides.ll 
To cover fully the ways in which legal issues concerning the en-
3 355 Mass. 179, 243 N.E.2d 189 (1969). 
4 355 Mass. 275, 244 N.E.2d 311 (1969). 
5 355 Mass. 328, 244 N.E.2d 577 (1969). 
61970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 81, 255 N.E.2d 347. 
7 Id. at 86, 255 N.E.2d at 351. 
s Acts of 1970, cc. 28, 150, 692, 693, 704, 767, 827, amending G.L., c. 21. 
9 Acts of 1970, c. 839. 
10 Acts of 1970, cc. 838, 841. 
l1 Acts of 1970, c, 874. 
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vironment may be presented and resolved in Massachusetts wo•tld 
be a difficult, if not impossible, task. This chapter therefore focuses 
solely on the federal and state laws relating to air and noise pollution 
as currently in effect in Massachusetts, and on some possible legislative 
and judicial reforms in this area.12 
§26.2. The law concerning air pollution in Massachusetts: Federal 
law. The primary federal air pollution control law for all states is 
the Air Quality Act of 1967,1 which was extensively amended by the 
Clean Air Amendments of 1970.2 Pursuant to the act as originally 
passed in 1967, the secretary of Health, Education and Welfare was 
required to designate atmospheric areas and air quality control re-
gions. In addition, he was required to publish air quality criteria and 
control technology data. Following the designations of such areas 
and control regions, each state was required, after public hearings, to 
adopt ambient air quality standards and an enforcement plan based 
on the air quality criteria and technical data for the particular region 
concerned. The act provides that economic and technological factors 
must be considered as well as the health and welfare of residents of 
the region. The act originally provided for rather cumbersome en-
forcement proceedings as follows: The secretary of Health, Education 
and Welfare, either at the request of the state's governor, or if he had 
reason to believe that pollution was "endangering the health and 
welfare of persons" in a state other than that which was discharging 
the pollutants, could call a conference of the pollution control agencies 
concerned at which all interested parties could present their views. 
After such a conference, the secretary would make recommendations 
to those pollution control agencies for remedial action. If nothing 
was done within six months by the agencies, the secretary could call 
a hearing before a special board provided for in the act. If nothing was 
done within six months after this board's findings and recommenda-
tions were sent to the agencies and polluters concerned, the secretary 
could request the United States attorney general to bring an enforce-
ment action. As of the date of this writing, there has been only one 
such abatement action brought in the courts, and no abatement 
order has as yet been issued. 3 
Prior to the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, federal law was pri-
marily designed to require the states to take the action necessary to 
12 An excellent publication, A Compendium of Environmental Legislation, is 
available at nominal cost from the Massachusetts Department of Public Health 
and lists by subject matter all existing Massachusetts statutory law dealing with 
environment. 
§26.2. 142 U.S.C. §§1857 et seq. (Supp. V 1970) [hereinafter referred to as the 
Clean Air Act]. 
2 Pub. L. No. 91·604, 9lst Cong. 2d Sess., 84 Stat. 1676 et seq. (1970) [hereinafter 
referred to as the Clean Air Amendments of 1970]. 
3 United States v. Bishop Processing Co., 287 F. Supp. 624 (D. Md. 1968), afj'd, 
423 F.2d 469 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 ·U.S. 904 (1970). 
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control air pollution. It provided no specific solutions itself. The 1970 
amendments have preserved the basic concept of federal impetus for 
a state-administered program. However, the position of the federal 
administrator has gained new significance. He is now required to 
establish national air quality standards, after which the states must 
provide means of implementation satisfactory to the federal authori-
ties.4 Federal enforcement of the state implementation plans may 
be accomplished by an order of the administrator to any person 
violating such a plan, or by a civil action brought by the administra-
tor in a federal district court.5 These changes, together with others 
not here described, provide for more effective federal control of state 
regulation and enforcement. The states must now meet national air 
quality standards instead of simply setting their own. Also, the states 
can now more readily be brought into line by the federal authorities 
than under the previous "conference calling" system. Nonetheless, the 
regulatory scheme in each state should continue to be a state's pri-
mary means for achieving whatever air quality standards that are 
set. In most instances, then, it is to the state regulations that one must 
look to determine what the impact of air quality standards will be 
upon particular types of air-polluting activity. (One partial exception 
to this is the regulation of motor vehicle emissions.) 
Since studies show that a substantial amount, and perhaps a ma-
jority, of air pollution is caused by vehicle emissions, the reduction 
of such emissions is clearly an important part of air pollution control. 
Federal air pollution control laws require the secretary of Health, 
Education and Welfare to establish exhaust emission standards for 
gasoline- and diesel-powered vehicles, and states are prohibited from 
adopting their own emission standards (with the exception of Cali-
fornia, which had adopted standards prior to the enactment of the 
federal laws).a Acting pursuant to this legislation, the secretary has 
already set standards for hydrocarbon, carbon monoxide, and nitro-
gen oxide emissions.7 In addition, recent amendments to federal law 
require a virtually pollution-free automobile by 1975, and autho-
rize withdrawal of official approval of any model of automobile 
or vehicle failing to meet federal standards.8 While it seems plain that 
the only comprehensive approach to air pollution caused by vehicle 
emissions is through federal legislation and regulations controlling 
vehicle engine manufacture, nevertheless there is room for state regula-
tions concerning such aspects of vehicle emissions as the time and 
place where vehicles o£ different types may be used, and the control 
4 §§109, llO, of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970. 
51d. §103. 
6 42 U.S.C. §§1857£·1 et seq. (Supp. V, 1970). The California standards are noted 
in Cal. Health and Safety §§39151 et seq. (West 1967). 
7 Environmental Quality, First Annual Report of the Council on Environ-
mental Quality, 21 Environment Rptr.- Federal Laws 0271 (Aug. 10, 1970). 
s Clean Air Amendments of 1970. 
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of mechanical defects which result in increased emissions. States may 
also play an important role in reducing air pollution due to vehicle 
emissions through their transportation planning programs by re-
ducing urban highway transportation and increasing mass transit 
facilities. 
One important but as yet untested provision in the Clean Air 
Amendments of 1970 is a section permitting private individuals to 
commence suit in federal district court against any person (including 
governmental authorities) who is alleged to be in violation of a 
standard for emissions set under the Clean Air Act or of any "order 
issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a stan-
dard."9 Since "emission standard" includes state as well as federal 
standards in this context, the scope of this new private right of action 
seems broad enough to include enforcement of almost all federal and 
state air pollution regulations. Before bringing suit, however, the 
plaintiff must give 60 days notice to the federal administrator, the 
state authorities concerned, and the alleged violator. A suit cannot 
be brought if the federal or state authorities are "diligently prosecut-
ing" a civil action against the violator in a state or federal court, but 
a private citizen may intervene in any federal court proceeding. The 
plaintiff may obtain equitable relief in his private proceeding, and 
may also recover reasonable attorney and expert witness fees, but 
there are no provisions relating to the recovery of damages and 
presumably these are not contemplated. (Rights of private citizens 
under other statutes or under common law, however, are expressly 
saved.) There are many questions of interpretation to be resolved con-
cerning the private citizen suit under the Clean Air Act, but it pro-
vides an important new enforcement mechanism in the air pollution 
regulatory scheme. 
§26.3. State law.1 General Laws, c. Ill, §§142A-142D provide 
that the Massachusetts Department of Public Health, with the ap-
proval of the governor, may establish air pollution control districts 
compatible with the federal air quality control regions; may establish 
other air pollution control districts as it may deem advisable and 
necessary; and may adopt and amend, after public hearings, air 
quality standards and plans for the implementation and enforcement 
of such standards. Pursuant to those sections, the department has, 
to date, set up six air quality control regions in Massachusetts, through 
its Bureau of Air Use Management: (1) Berkshire (Berkshire County); 
(2) Pioneer Valley (Franklin, Hampden and Hampshire Counties); (3) 
Central Massachusetts (Worcester County); (4) Southeastern Massa-
chusetts (Barnstable, Bristol, Dukes, and Nantucket Counties, and a 
portion of Norfolk and Plymouth Counties); (5) Merrimack Valley 
(the northern portions of Essex and Middlesex Counties); and (6) 
9 ld. §304. 
§26.3. 1 See also §24.15 supra. 
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Metropolitan Boston (Suffolk County and the remaining portions of 
Plymouth, Norfolk, Essex and Middlesex Counties). The department 
has adopted statewide standards for total suspended particulates 
(micrograms per cubic meter of air), and sulfur dioxide (micrograms 
per cubic meter of air). The standards were adopted after public 
hearings at which several groups and persons interested in air pollu-
tion testified. The standards were originally submitted for approval to 
the secretary of the United States Department of Health, Education 
and Welfare on January 15, 1970, were subsequently amended, at 
least partially in response to the demands of conservation groups that 
they be made stricter, and were finally approved by the National Air 
Pollution Control Administration (a subdivision of the Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare) in March, 1970. Ambient air quality 
standards for carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons, oxides of nitrogen, 
lead, fluorides, and odors are to be adopted in the future and may 
be in effect by the time this volume is published. Once a comprehen-
sive set of standards has been established, it will set forth for the 
foreseeable future just how clean our Massachusetts air should be, 
assuming, of course, that the various standards can be met. 
With respect to a state enforcement plan to bring tl1e state's air 
into conformity with the existing and proposed air quality standards, 
regulations have been adopted by the Department of Public Health 
for all six air pollution control districts, which became effective be-
tween June and September, 1970. The regulations are essentially simi-
lar in all six districts, although, as might be expected, they are more 
rigid in several respects in the more populated eastern area of the 
state than in western Massachusetts.2 
Regulation 1.1 for each of the districts provides: 
No person owning, leasing, or controlling the operation of any 
air contamination so:urce shall willfully, negligently, or through 
failure to provide necessary equipment or to take necessary 
precautions permit any ePiission from said air contamination 
source or sources of such quantities of air contaminants which 
will cause, by themselves or in conjunction with other air con-
taminants, a condition. of air pollution. 
"Air pollution" is defined as the presence in the air of such con-
taminants as would cause a nuisance, or "tend to be" injurious to life 
or property, or "unreasonably interfere" with the enjoyment of life 
or property. Surely it is hard to quarrel with the sweeping prohibition 
contained in this regulation, which presumably is violated every day 
by every automobile· driver and fuel burner in Boston, and which, by 
itself, would seem to have little, if any, effect. Fortunately, the re-
maining regulations are all more specific. Regulations 2, 3 and 4 re-
quire that the Department's approval be obtained before various types 
2 Copies of the regulations may be obtained from the DPU without charge. 
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of "thermal energy utilization facilities" can be constructed, and also 
provide for inspection and supervision ~f the continued operation of 
existing facilities. The intent of these regulations is clearly to require 
that as improved air pollution control devices are made available for 
fuel-burning facilities, that they be incorporated into new and exist-
ing installations. It is unclear, however, just how far the Department 
can go in terms of cost in requiring that the latest technological ad-
vances be utilized. 
Regulation 5 prescribes the permissible sulfur and ash content for 
"fossil fuels" (namely, coal and oil). Based upon size of fuel facility 
and geographical location, a timetable is specified according to which 
most areas of the state will be burning a relatively low-sulfur-content 
fuel by October I, 1971. The effect of Regulation 5 has already been 
felt in the Metropolitan Boston District, where low-sulfur fuel was 
required by October I, 1970. Although the Boston Edison Company 
(the largest single user in the district) sought a variance from the low-
sulfur-fuel requirement on the ground that the resulting decrease in 
contaminants was not justified by the increased fuel cost to be borne 
by consumers of electricity, the variance was denied, following a 
public hearing, on September 29, 1970. Since the cost-benefit argument 
would also seem to apply to other companies besides Boston Edison 
(although the latter claimed that its high stocks made it a special 
case), the denial of this variance was an important step in implement-
ing the regulations. 
Regulation 6 prohibits the emission of smoke from various sources 
in violation of specified standards for each source. The standards are 
expressed in terms of time periods and the so-called Ringelmann 
Scale, which is a scale of different shades of smoke. For example, after 
December 31, 1972, no aircraft will be permitted to emit smoke 
denser than #2 on the Ringelmann Scale for more than ten seconds 
during landing or takeoff. 
Regulation 7 prohibits all open burning except in certain limited 
instances. Regulation 8 requires that the construction of new in-
cinerators, including municipal incinerators, be approved by the De-
partment of Public Health in writing, and that on July 1, 1971, and 
thereafter, all existing incinerators must be "of a design ... approved 
by the Department" (effective July 1, 1972, for municipal incinerators). 
Regulation 9 generally prohibits the emission of dust or odor which 
causes or contributes to a condition of air pollution. 
Regulation 10 deals with noise. Regulation 10.1 suffers from the 
same lack of precision which characterizes Regulation I. I: 
No person owning, leasing, or controlling a source of noise 
shall willfully, negligently, or through failure to provide neces-
sary equipment, service, or maintenance or to take necessary 
precautions cause, suffer, allow, or permit unnecessary emissions 
from said source of noise. 
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The rest of Regulation 10 does little to improve upon the general 
language of Regulation 10.1. Until more specific noise regulations are 
adopted, therefore, Regulation 10 will permit enforcement action 
against almost all unpleasant sources of noise but will not seem to 
require such action. 
Regulation 11 deals with "transportation media." It requires all 
motor vehicles to comply with pertinent regulations of the Registry 
of Motor Vehicles.a Regulation 11.1.2 provides that no person may per-
mit "the unnecessary operation" of a motor vehicle engine while the 
vehicle is stopped for "a foreseeable period of time in excess of five 
minutes," except for repair of the vehicle, or where engine power is 
necessary for an "associated power" such as a conveyor belt. Enforce-
ment of this regulation, while undoubtedly beneficial, seems an am-
bitious undertaking indeed, especially on a cold morning at 9 A.M. on 
the Southeast Expressway. Regulation 11 also prohibits, in general 
terms, the operation of diesel trains, aircraft or marine vessels (in 
those districts where applicable) in a manner that will cause or con-
tribute to a condition of air pollution. 
Enforcement of the state air pollution control regulations is largely 
in the hands of the Department of Public Health, although Regula-
tion 52.2 permits any local police department, fire department, or 
board of health official "acting within his jurisdiction" to enforce the 
regulations dealing with open burning, dust and odors, noise, and 
emissions from motor vehicles and trains. The DPU, or any person 
authorized by the department, may enforce its regulations by a suit in 
equity in the Supreme Judicial Court or in the Superior Court.4 As far 
as criminal penalties are concerned, violation of the state air pollution 
regulations results first in a notice to the offender, after which con-
tinued violation is a misdemeanor. A first conviction is punishable by 
a $10 to $50 fine, while subsequent violations may bring a $200 to 
$500 fine.5 As is the case with most Massachusetts regulations, there is 
no authority for a private citizen to enforce the regulations, except 
perhaps the rather awkward remedy of a petition for writ of man-
damus to compel action by the public authorities. At present, there-
fore, the effectiveness of the state regulations depends entirely upon 
the efforts of administrative personnel. 
In addition to the regulations at the state level concerning air pollu-
tion, cities and towns are also empowered to adopt regulations in 
this area either through their respective boards of health or through a 
specially created authority. These regulations must be approved by the 
Department of Public Health.6 Boston, for example, by a resolution of 
the City Council, has created its own Air Pollution Control Commis-
a The Registry of Motor Vehicles may prohibit the emission of excessive noise 
or smoke from an automobile muffler or exhaust system. G.L., c. 90, §§16, 20. 
4 Id. c. lll, §142A. 
5 Id. §§142A, 3IC. 
6 Id. §31C. 
8
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1970 [1970], Art. 29
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1970/iss1/29
§26.4 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 657 
sion which has adopted fairly extensive regulations governing various 
types of air-polluting activity within the city. Thus in a city or town 
with its own regulations, a source of air pollution must conform to 
dual sets of regulato_ry schemes and administrative processes. Direct 
inconsistency between the regulations is unlikely due to the require-
ment that the state agency approve local regulations before they are 
effective. Nonetheless, there are bound to be differences in application 
of the two systems to a given situation, which will almost certainly 
result in some confusion and complication in the enforcement 
mechanism and in efforts at compliance. The justification for dual 
regulation is that particular locations may have special problems 
requiring more stringent standards than those generally applicable 
within an air pollution control district, or they may have problems 
that are not covered at all by the state regulations. Whether this 
justification will prove satisfactory is a question which will probably 
take several years to answer. In any event, a lawyer confronted with 
an air pollution problem must determine the effect of any local 
regulations which may exist in addition to that of the state regula-
tions. 
§26.4. Massachusetts decisions. It is likely that for some time to 
come the existence of regulations concerning air pollution will not 
eliminate lawsuits against alleged polluters based upon common law 
concepts. This is true, first, because specific regulations presently do 
not cover all possible sources of air pollution and, second, because a 
person damaged by air pollution may well consider that the air 
quality standards and enforcement provisions contained in the regu-
lations are not adequate to protect his rights. There is also the possi-
bility that a private citizen may seek to have existing laws and regula-
tions enforced himself in the face of administrative inaction. The 
primary theory for a potential plaintiff to use against a polluter, aside 
from seeking enforcement of existing regulations, is the common law of 
action for nuisance. There are, however, at least three major hurdles 
to be overcome by a plaintiff who seeks to prevent air-polluting 
activity through a nuisance action. 
First, the plaintiff must show that he has been injured in some 
special way not suffered by the rest of the public.1 Unless the plaintiff 
can show particular injury to his person or property from a condition 
of air pollution, he cannot maintain a nuisance action. This rule 
§26.4. 1 A public nuisance may only be prosecuted by government authorities. 
Shaw v. Cummiskey, 24 Mass. 76 (1828); Jones v. Town of Great Barrington, 273 
Mass. 483, 174 N.E. liB (1930). Actually, there is no express statutory authority for 
a nuisance action. General Laws, c. Ill, §130, provides for injunctive relief from 
a nuisance while prosecution is pending against the source. Section 140 of the same 
chapter allows the Superior Court to enjoin a nuisance that has developed at a site 
assigned by the city or town for "noisome trades" (§143). The concept and elements 
of a "nuisance," however, are still derived hom case law, since "nuisance" is not a 
defined term. In this sense, the action of "nuisance" is still, for all practical 
purposes, a common law remedy. 
9
Johnson and Del Vecchio: Chapter 26: Environmental Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1970
658 1970 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETIS LAW §26.4 
generally will not be a problem for persons attacking a neighboring 
source of pollution, such as a town dump, a manufacturing plant, or 
other isolated locations. However, it clearly would be a problem for 
a plaintiff who alleged, for example, that a large utility in a metro-
politan area was producing sulfur dioxide in sufficient quantities to 
impair the health of all those who breathed the air in that city. The 
line between special damage, which will support a private action in 
such a situation, and mere "public" injury is unclear. Compare Bor-
den v. Vincent,2 which held that a bridge across a navigable river was 
a public nuisance but no member of the public could sue in his 
individual capacity to remove it, with Flynn v. Butler,3 holding that 
a person injured by the explosion of a powder magazine which had 
become a public nuisance could enforce its removal in an individual 
action. Presumably a plaintiff who could show that his own health 
had been impaired could overcome the standing hurdle in a suit 
against a large utility. 
The second hurdle for a plaintiff in a nuisance suit against an air 
polluter is proving that the injury alleged has occurred as a proximate 
result of the defendant's activities. The defendant must have caused 
the injury in order to be liable for the nuisance.4 In Downing v. 
Elliott,5 the plaintiffs sought an injunction restraining the defendant 
from using soft coal in the steam-heating plant of his greenhouse, 
since the soot and cinders from the plant were rendering the plain-
tiff's "ice crop" unfit for use. An injunction was denied on the ground 
that, since the soot and cinders deposited from the defendant's chim-
ney were "insignificant" compared with those coming from many other 
chimneys, the defendant had not caused the plaintiff's damage. This 
is a familiar application of the "but for" rule in tort law, that is, 
plaintiff cannot recover unless his injury would not have resulted but 
for the defendant's conduct. Returning again to the hypothetical case 
of the large urban utility, the barrier erected by this rule is usually 
considered insurmountable. Even where the utility was the largest 
single user in the area, it would seldom be possible to show that a 
general air pollution condition, or even one chemical element of such 
a condition, would not have resulted but for the utility's emissions.6 
It may be argued that the use of the nuisance doctrine against a pol-
luter such as a large utility in a metropolitan area is not an effective, 
or even a fair, weapon to control air pollution. Certainly a com-
2 41 Mass. 301 (1836). 
a 189 Mass. 377, 75 N.E. 730 (1905). 
4 McDonald v. Dundon, 242 Mass. 229, 136 N.E. 264, 26 A.L.R. 1243 (1922); 
Downing v. Elliott, 182 Mass. 28, 64 N.E. 201 (1902). 
5 182 Mass. 28, 64 N.E. 201 (1902). 
6 E.g., a study conducted by the Boston Edison Company itself showed that ap-
proximately 15 percent of the ground level sulfur dioxide concentration in the 
city of Boston at several different testing locations was caused by emissions from 
Boston Edison's fuel-burning locations. 
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munity needs products such as electricity, which cause emission of 
pollutants; and if air quality standards have been set and enforcing 
regulations adopted, all of which the alleged polluter complies with, 
one might ask why a plaintiff should have any additional rights to 
hold the utility liable for damages on a nuisance theory. Under the 
present state of medical knowledge, it would be very difficult to show 
that a particular person suffering from a respiratory disease had con-
tracted it, or had been made substantially worse, as a result of air 
pollution. Suppose, however, that such proof were forthcoming, as it 
may be when more knowledge about the effects of air pollution is 
acquired. If a plaintiff can show that he has contracted lung cancer, 
or that his lung cancer has been seriously aggravated, as a result of the 
polluted air which he has breathed for many years, should he not be 
allowed to recover damages against the air-polluter whose activities 
caused or aggravated his illness? In a real sense, the air-polluter and 
the consumers of its products have benefited from the fact that they 
were allowed to use the air without cost except to the health of the 
plaintiff. Surely it seems equitable for this cost, once it has been rec-
ognized, to be passed on to the consumers of the products, the produc-
tion of which caused the injurious emissions. And if, as some fear, the 
regulatory scheme does not in fact reduce air pollution to harmless 
levels in the future, what other means but an action for damages can 
redress the resulting loss? 
The third hurdle in a nuisance action is the standard against which 
the defendant's conduct is to be judged. Although negligence need 
not be shown to constitute a nuisance,7 a defendant's use of its prem-
ises must be at least "unreasonable" with respect to the persons in-
jured by such use. This frequently brings about application of the 
so-called balancing test. In De Blois v. Bowers,8 plaintiffs owning 
residences located near a steelworks sought to enjoin the works from 
maintaining a nuisance by the emission of obnoxious fumes and 
odors. Although the court found that the plant did produce offensive 
odors, and that these may have caused some illness, it refused to enjoin 
its operation based upon findings that (l) its operation could not be 
significantly improved so as to reduce or eliminate the odors; and (2) 
the harm to the community from shutting down the plant, including 
the loss of jobs and the reduction in steel production capacity, was 
greater than the possible injury to the plaintiffs if the operation con-
tinued. In Pendoley v. Ferreira,9 a piggery was enjoined from further 
operation because its obnoxious odors unreasonably interfered with 
the interests of a group of neighboring residential plaintiffs. The 
plaintiffs were also awarded damages for the interference with their 
interests during the period when the piggery was to be gradually elim-
7 United Electric Light Co. v. Deliso Constr. Co., 315 Mass. 313, 52 N.E.2d 553 
(1943). 
8 44 F.2d 621 (1st Cir. 1930). 
9 345 Mass. 309, 187 N.E.2d 142 (1963). 
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inated. A recent decision of the New York Court of Appeals, however, 
illustrates the opposite result where the defendant's conduct was con-
sidered more valuable to society than was the operation of a piggery. 
In Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.,to the court refused to enjoin the 
operation of a cement plant on the ground that the damage to the 
plaintiffs, who were neighboring homeowners, from dust and other air 
contaminants was less than the damage which the defendant corpora-
tion and its 300 employees would suffer if the plant were closed by an 
injunction. The plaintiffs were awarded damages, however, to be 
computed for both past and anticipated injury and paid only once. 
The balancing-test approach to a nuisance suit thus presently seems 
to make it much easier to get rid of minor causes of air pollution, such 
as piggeries, than to eliminate major air pollution sources such as 
cement factories or steel plants. Perhaps as scientific knowledge about 
the effect of air pollution on health and property improves, it will 
be possible to supply a piece of the balancing equation now missing: 
the long-term cost to society of a general air pollution condition. So 
long as the "harm" to the plaintiffs in weighing the balance is viewed 
only as the immediate, demonstrable effect on residents neighboring 
the polluting activity, it seems unlikely that injunctive relief will be 
granted against many substantial businesses even where a group or 
class of plaintiffs can show that the defendant's pollution is a proximate 
cause of their injury. A plaintiff who has overcome the hurdles of 
special injury and causation, however, can at least recover damages 
if he proves that the defendant's conduct was unreasonable, even if 
he cannot obtain injunctive relief. 
It will be interesting to note the effect on cases subject to the balanc-
ing test of the new air pollution control regulations. Presumably, a 
defendant who was violating the regulations would be acting unreason-
ably. But query whether the plaintiff is thereby entitled to an injunc-
tion (assuming the administrative authorities for some reason do not 
take action), or whether the defendant is still entitled, as against a 
private plaintiff, to the application of the balancing test. By virtue of 
a "savings clause" in G.L., c. Ill, §142C, par. 6, it appears that a de-
fendant who complies with all applicable air pollution control regula-
tions is not thereby relieved of any common law liability for creating 
a nuisance. It is questionable, however, whether a judge will be likely 
to hold that a defendant is acting unreasonably where the polluting 
s9urce is maintained in strict compliance with specifically applicable 
regulations, for example, an incinerator constructed in accordance 
with plans approved by the Department of Public Health. 
Because of the problems inherent in asserting a nuisance action 
against an air-polluter, such an action has at present very limited effi-
cacy as an overall solution to the air pollution problem. In the 1969-
10 287 N.Y.S.2d 112, aff'd, 294 N.Y.S.2d 452, rev'd, !109 N.Y.S.2d !112, 257 N.E.2d 870 
(1970). . 
12
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1970 [1970], Art. 29
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1970/iss1/29
§26.5 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 661 
1970 session of the Massachusetts legislature, an interesting proposal 
was submitted which would have created a private right of action for 
air pollution damage in a manner designed to overcome the traditional 
hurdles for a plaintiff in the common law of nuisance. This proposal 
is worth examining as a method of attack on the air pollution problem 
wholly different from the setting of air quality standards and enforce-
ment regulations. 
§26.5. A legislative proposal. In Senate Bill 907 of 1970, the three 
hurdles of standing, causation, and the balancing test standard would 
all be substantially reduced for a prospective plaintiff.1 Standing 
would be handled by permitting "any person located within an air 
poli.ution control district" to bring an action in Superior Court 
against "any other person located within said district."2 Proof of air 
pollution by the defendant conclusively establishes injury to the 
plaintiff.3 For this purpose, "air pollution" is defined to mean "the 
emission into the atmosphere of air contaminants in such quantities, 
from any single source or combination of sources, as is or tends to be 
injurious to human health or welfare, animal or plant life, or prop-
erty, or which would unreasonably interfere with the comfortable 
enjoyment of life or property." (It will be recalled that this is essentially 
the same definition as appeared in the state regulations.) 
Causation is handled by Senate Bill 907 through the following pro-
vision: 
... [P]roof that a given air contaminant has injured plaintiff 
and that the defendant's enterprise or activity emits a given por-
tion of the sum total of all of said air contaminant emitted within 
the air pollution control district where the parties are located 
shall establish a conclusive presumption that defendant is liable 
for an equivalent portion of plaintiff's injury from said air 
contaminant.4 
Thus, in our hypothetical situation involving the large metropolitan 
utility which produces X percent of a given air contaminant, a plain-
tiff who could prove that his respiratory illness had been caused or 
aggravated by this contaminant would be able to recover damages in 
an amount proportionate to the percentage of total emissions of the 
particular contaminant produced by the defendant. The plaintiff 
still faces the difficult problem of proving which contaminant injured 
him, but at least his problem is not insurmountable. 
With respect to equitable relief, if the plaintiff can prove that the 
defendant is emitting air contaminants, and that there is at least one 
§26.5. 1 An equivalent proposal has been submitted in the 1971 session as 
House Bill 1177. 
2 Senate Bill 907, §2 (1970 Sess.). 
3lbid. 
4 Id. §2(c). 
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method of abatement available, the defendant must abate pursuant 
to this method unless he can prove by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that it would be "prohibitive" for him to abate.5 "Prohibitive" 
is defined to mean a cost "so great as to threaten seriously the con-
tinuation of the enterprise or activity under consideration."6 Even 
if abatement is not allowed, either because no method of abatement 
is technically available or because the cost of it would be "prohibi-
tive," a plaintiff may still seek an injunction against continuation of 
the business, or any part thereof that causes air pollution, under the 
old balancing-test principle. In applying the balancing test, however, 
the court must weigh the social value of the defendant's enterprise 
against "the social cost of air pollution by defendant." For this pur-
pose, "social cost of air pollution" means the "injurious effects of air 
pollution on all those affected by it." This would thus shift the focus 
of the old balancing test away from the plaintiffs in the action at hand 
and require a more comprehensive examination by the court of the 
cost of pollution. 
There are obviously many probleiDS and questions left unanswered 
by a proposal such as Senate Bill 907. It is unclear, for example, 
whether a plaintiff can recover damages based upon emissions by the 
defendant if such damage has been sustained by the plaintiff over a 
long period of time prior to enactment of the statute. Although the 
plaintiff's task is made considerably easier by Senate Bill 907, plaintiff 
is still presented with formidable problems of proof, establishing 
either that there is a technical method of abatement available to the 
defendant which he has not used or that the plaintiff has suffered a 
particular injury from a given air contaminant. (Since the typical 
air pollution condition consists of many contaminants mixed together, 
it may be extremely difficult even under the provisions of a statute 
such as Senate 907 for plaintiff to succeed in proving damages.) 
Senate Bill 907 can also be attacked on the ground that it permits 
suits even if the defendant is in compliance with applicable regula-
tions. The bill specifically provides that compliance with a statute or 
regulation does not constitute a defense. Thus, even a defendant who 
complies in good faith with regulations adopted by the appropriate 
authorities cannot be sure that he will not be exposed to suits by pri-
vate plaintiffs seeking to force him to abate, to recover damages, or 
to put him out of business entirely. It was perhaps largely because 
of this potential threat to business activity that Senate Bill 907 met 
an untimely death in the 1970 legislative session. 
On the other hand, if our society is serious about eliminating air 
pollution and preserving the quality of our air as a natural resource, 
there is much to be said for a proposal such as Senate Bill 907. The 
requirement that a defendant must abate to the greatest extent pos-
II ld. §2(a). 
6 ld. §l(f). 
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sible short of going out of business seems a desirable social policy. 
Even though it may result in a lessening of business activity in some 
instances, the principle of treating the cost of maximum air protec-
tion as a necessary cost of doing business may be the only way to 
achieve an effective clean air program. Although the same "built-in-
cost" approach can perhaps be achieved through specific regulations, 
regulations are not likely to require all polluters to achieve the 
highest state of the art in air protection at all times. There are bound 
to be gaps in coverage and failures to keep the regulations up to date. 
The private abatement action can thus serve as a useful supplement 
to the regulatory approach. 
With respect to the damages allowed by Senate Bill 907, those who 
can prove illness caused by air pollution have truly borne the cost 
of such pollution and have conferred a corresponding benefit upon 
all those who actively contribute to such pollution, including not only 
institutional polluters but all individuals who produce garbage and 
consume electricity, heat, and the other products which result in air 
pollution. Assuming appropriate medical proof of injury, division of 
the cost among the polluters involved (who will pass it on eventually 
to the ultimate consumers of their products) seems a desirable result 
which would probably not occur under existing case law. One aspect 
of Senate Bill 907 which seems particularly sound is the provision 
which requires abatement at least to the level of existing laws or 
regulations. There would seem to be little harm, and a great deal 
of benefit, in permitting private citizens to enforce air pollution 
regulations where the government authorities have failed to act. As 
already noted, federal law now permits a private citizen to enforce 
federal and state regulations in certain situations, and whether or 
not a private right of action statute similar to Senate Bill 907 is 
enacted, a bill which simply permitted enforcement of existing law 
clearly should be passed. 
§26.6. Control and regulation of excessive noise. Noise has been 
defined as "any sound that is undesired" by the receiver or which is 
"noticeably loud, harsh or discordant."1 It has been the source of 
annoyance ever since man began living communally. While, at the 
height of the machine age, we are presently being subjected to more 
noise than at any other time in history, noise has long been the sub-
ject of legal controversy. Some of the earliest cases of the common 
law were concerned with the right to peaceful enjoyment of property, 
and today the number of such cases continues to grow. 
There are essentially three categories of actionable noise: actions 
between private individuals, actions between private individuals and 
§26.6. 1 Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 968, 970 (N.D. Ill. 1968), quoting from 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1533 (1961). See Handbook of 
Noise Control 1-11 (Harris ed. 1957). As to noise and actionable nuisance in 
Massachusetts, see Tortorella v. H. Traiser & Co., 284 Mass. 497, 188 N.E. 254 
(1933); Stevens v. Rockport Granite Co., 216 Mass. 486, 104 N.E. 371 (1914). 
15
Johnson and Del Vecchio: Chapter 26: Environmental Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1970
664 1970 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETIS LAW §26.6 
government, and actions between governments and governmental 
agencies. Before proceeding to a discussion of these three categories, 
however, it is first necessary to discuss the nature of noise- how it 
is defined, measured, categorized and compared. 
As the aforementioned definition of noise suggests, noise is almost 
entirely subjective; whether a particular sound is annoying lies in the 
ear of the listener. What may be music to one may be noise to 
another. Because of its subjective nature, noise, of all the pollutants, 
is probably the most difficult to measure objectively. There are, of 
course, devices which measure all aspects of sound: decibel level, in-
tensity, frequency, pitch and duration. Generally, insofar as the law 
has been concerned with noise, in the absence of specific standards 
the question of whether a particular sound is noise has been de-
termined by the test of whether a person of ordinary sensibilities 
would consider the sound annoying.2 Some courts have recognized 
that the test is entirely subjective and inadequate for a fair determina-
tion of all cases, and have attempted to devise more objective tests. 
In attempting to make standards for recovery as objective as possible, 
however, courts, in many instances, have stretched existing objective 
tests devised for subjects of a more tangible nature, depending upon 
the legal theory asserted and applied. In actions brought under a 
theory of trespass for damage to property caused by noise pollution 
resulting from overflying aircraft, most courts require a physical 
invasion of the airspace directly over the property by the aircraft 
from which the sound emits.3 The test is certainly objt!ctive, but it 
is hardly adequate. The landowner whose property lies adjacent to 
an airport, yet not directly under a flight path, cannot recover dam-
ages for the injury to his property resulting from sideline noise which 
may be just as annoying and damaging, because the aircraft does not 
actually invade the airspace above his property.' The inquiry should 
2 See, e.g., Godard v. Babson-Dow Mfg. Co., 313 Mass. 280, 47 N.E.2d 303 (1943); 
Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385 (1930); Davis v. 
Sawyer, 133 Mass. 289 (1882). 
3 See Causby v. United States, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Griggs v. Allegheny County, 
369 U.S. 84, petition for rehearing denied, 369 U.S. 857 (1962); Swetland v. Curtiss 
Airports Corp., 55 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1932). See also Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny 
County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 
Sup. Ct. Rev. 63. 
4 See, e.g., Avery v. United States, 330 F.2d 640 (Ct. Cl. 1964); Leavell v. United 
States, 234 F. Supp. 734 (E.D.S.C. 1964); United States v. 3276.21 Acres of Land, 222 
F. Supp. 887 (S.D. Cal. 1963); Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (lOth Cir. 1962), 
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963), rehearing denied, 372 U.S. 925 (1963) (note dissent 
of Chief Judge Murrah on the overflight requirement); Moore v. United States, 185 
F. Supp. 399 (N.D. Tex. 1960); Matson v. United States, 171 F. Supp. 283 (Ct. Cl. 
1959); Freeman v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Okla. 1958); Nunally v. 
United States, 239 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1956). But cf. United States v. Certain Parcels 
of Land in Kent County, Mich., 252 F. Supp. 319 (W.D. Mich. 1966); Henthorn v. 
Oklahoma City, 453 P.2d 1013 (Okla. 1969); Board of Educ. of Town of Morris-
town v. Palmer, 88 N.J. Super. 378, 2'12 A.2d 564 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1965); Martin 
v. Port of Seattle,. 64. Wash. 324, 391 P.2d 540 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989 
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not be whether the source of the noise invades the property, but 
whether the noise itself invades the property. A visual test should 
not be applied to an audible problem; a more proper test would be 
to determine a trespass on the basis of the sound emission. If this 
test were applied, the landowner whose property lies adjacent to the 
airport would recover damages in an action brought in trespass on 
the same terms as his neighbor whose property lies under a flight 
path. Courts first must recognize that noise is a unique pollutant and 
then devise new tests based on current technology which can be ap-
plied to insure the fair and uniform determination of all cases. 
In the first category, actions between private individuals, the com-
mon law theories of trespass and nuisance obtain in Massachusetts. 
The remedies available are damages andfor injunctive relief. Not 
surprisingly, in most noise cases wherein trespass has been the theory 
of recovery, the matter in controversy has been noise emanating from 
aircraft operation. In Smith v. New England Aircraft Co.,5 the 
Supreme Judicial Court, in finding for the defendant, discussed at 
length the theory of trespass. The Court stated that a portion of the 
airspace above the land of the plaintiffs was navigable airspace and 
could be regulated "in the interest of the public _welfare."6 Moreover, 
that portion of the airspace not actually in the effective possession of 
the landowner and not actually utilized by him could be invaded by 
aircraft without giving rise to a compensable legal action. The Court 
essentially divided the airspace above the landowner's property into 
two segments, the lower segment, actually utilized by the landowner, 
to which he had the exclusive right of possession, and the upper 
segment subject to invasion by aircraft without compensation to the 
landowner. Thedivision was made on the basis of weighing the right 
to exclusive possession versus the public necessity of navigation. Even 
though overflights had occurred, the Court held that the invasion 
was not compensable. 
In a similar case, Burnham v. Beverly Airways, Inc.,1 the Supreme 
Judicial Court reiterated the prior reasoning of the Smith case re-
garding the division of the airspace above a landowner's property in 
granting an injunction and nominal damages. The Court stated that 
even though an invasion of airspace might be a technical trespass, 
... such passage is a trespass unless substantially harmless and 
unless justified upon striking a reasonable balance between the 
landowner's right to exclusive possession free from intrusion and 
the public interest in necessary and convenient travel by air.s 
(1965); Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962), noted 
in 41 Texas L. Rev. 827 (1963). As to noise pollution and railroads, see Richards 
v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546, 551·552 (1914). 
5 270 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385 (1930). 
6 Id. at 521, 170 N.E. at 389. 
7 !Ill Mass. 628, 42 N.E.2d 575 (1942). 
8 Id. at 636-637. 42 N.E.2d at 579. 
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Massachusetts has never done away with the overflight requirement 
in cases brought for compensation for harm caused by aircraft noise 
on a trespass theory. 
Generally, in the case of a continuing trespass in Massachusetts, 
injunctive relief is granted as the most effective means of abating the 
problem. In Fenton v. Quaboag Country Club> Inc.,9 for instance, 
injunctive relief was granted and damages were confined· to the loss 
of rental value of the property during the term of the trespass rather 
than the diminution of the value of the property. The Supreme 
Judicial Court weighed the public benefit and the private harm 
resulting from the activity in determining whether injunctive relief 
should be granted. There have been no recent cases in Massachusetts 
in which injunctive relief has been granted as a means of abating 
airplane noise in suits brought upon a trespass theory. This is un-
doubtedly due to the fact that travel by air has become so essential 
that the benefit to the public far outweighs any and all harm to the 
individuals who may live beneath the flight paths of aircraft. 
The most common basis of suits brought for injuries caused by 
noise is nuisance. Nuisance can be divided into two categories: public 
and private.1o In the case of a public nuisance in Massachusetts, the 
plaintiff, in order to prevail, must show that a special injury resulted 
to him alone, not suffered in common with all others.11 Actions for 
private nuisances in Massachusetts are governed by G.L., c. 243. The 
plaintiff must allege in his complaint that the conduct of the defendant 
out of which the nuisance arises is either intentional, wanton or 
reckless, or negligent.12 In the absence of such an allegation, Massa-
chusetts courts will construe an allegation of nonfeasance rather than 
malfeasance.1s In the case of Mills v. Keeler,14 the Supreme Judicial 
Court stated: "The single word 'nuisance' by itself does not supply a 
case good against demurrer."15 Nuisance is concerned with the use 
and enjoyment of property rather than the exclusive possession of 
it, and the test utilized in determining cases based upon a nuisance 
theory is whether a person of "ordinary sensibilities" was prevented 
from the full use and enjoyment of his property.l6 Moreover, the 
Massachusetts courts weigh all of the circumstances in determining, 
as a matter of fact, whether the nuisance existed17 and whether an 
9 353 Mass. 534, 233 N.E.2d 216 (1968). 
10 In Massachusetts, actions for private nuisances are governed by G.L., c. 243. 
11 Brown v. Perkins, 78 Mass. 89 (1858); Jones v. Inhabitants of Town of Great 
Barrington, 273 Mass. 483, 179 N.E. liS (1930). See Prosser, Private Action for 
Public Nuisance, 52 Va. L. Rev. 997 (1966). 
12 Mills v. Keeler, 351 Mass. 502, 222 N.E.2d 749 (1967). 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Id. at 504, 222 N.E.2d at 751. 
16 Stevens v. Rockport Granite Co., 216 Mass. 486, 104 N.E. 371 (1914). 
17 Flynn v. Town of Seekonk, 352 Mass. 71,, 72, 223 N.E.2d 690, 691 (1967), citing 
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action will lie.18 In Stevens v. Rockport Granite Co.,tD in which an 
action was brought by a resident of a summer vacation colony against 
the operator of noisy equipment, the Supreme Judicial Court weighed 
the general character and use of the neighborhood against the 
benefit to the public in having the granite company operate. In ad-
dition, the Court considered the expense of having the noise abated 
and whether the company should have adopted noise abatement 
procedures. 
In an action for nuisance, it lies with the plaintiff to show sub-
stantial damage to either health or property in order to prevail. In 
Cohen v. Cohen,2° in which the plaintiff alleged mental anguish due 
to the noisy operation of a nearby dance hall, the Supreme Judicial 
Court, in a rescript opinion, found for the defendant on the basis 
that the alleged harm was not sufficient for a remedy of either dam-
ages or injunctive relief. In Proulx v. Basbanes,2l in which the plain-
tiffs showed actual physical damage to health and property as the 
result of the vibrations and noise emanating from an adjoining 
laundry, the Court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to injunctive 
relief and damages. Where ultra-hazardous activity is the cause of 
the nuisance, as in Reppucci v. Poleari,22 in which the defendant was 
maintaining blasting operations, negligence on the part of the de-
fendant need not be shown in order for the plaintiff to prevail. How-
ever, an individual acting under a license from a governmental agency 
and complying with those terms may use the license as a defense to 
an action in nuisance. In Strachan v. Beacon Oil Co.,23 for instance, 
the Supreme Judicial Court stated that acts which ordinarily would 
constitute a nuisance in the absence of a license would not be con-
sidered a nuisance where the activity is performed by a licensee in 
conformity with the terms of the license. The activity must be per-
formed in accordance with the terms of the license and a reason-
ableness test is applied by the courts in considering this defense. 
Massachusetts courts are using traditional common law standards to 
determine whether the noise annoyance complained of constitutes a 
nuisance and whether the plaintiff should accordingly prevail. The 
test of whether the noise constitutes a nuisance involves an inquiry 
into whether a person of "ordinary sensibilities" would be deprived 
of the use and enjoyment of his property because of that noise.24 
Such a test is very subjective. The Supreme Judicial Court has not 
Loosian v. Goudreault, !135 Mass. 253, 255, 139 N.E.2d 403, 405 (1957), and 
Senctore v. Blinn, 342 Mass. 778, 174 N.E.2d 437 (1961). 
18 See Lloyd, Noise as a Nuisance, 82 U. Pa. L. Rev. 567, 569 (1934). 
19 216 Mass. 486, 104 N.E. 371 (1914). 
20 !152 Mass. 78!1, 227 N.E.2d 700 (1967). 
21 354 Mass. 559, 238 N.E.2d 5!11 (1968), noted in 1968 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §3.4. 
22 291 Mass. 424, 197 N.E. 56 (1935). 
23 251 Mass. 479, 146 N.E. 787 (1925). 
24 Malm v. Dubrey, !125 Mass. 6!1, 88 N.E.2d 900 (1949); Tortorella ''· H. Traiser 
& Co., 284 Mass. 497, 188 N.E. 254 (1934). 
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yet determined private actions for nuisances on the bases of decibel, 
pitch, frequency, or intensity standards, although sufficient tech-
nology is available to successfully apply such criteria. While a bill 
providing for a private right of action, as discussed earlier in this 
chapter, could be utilized in noise cases by grounding such right 
upon technical regulations of various governmental agencies charged 
with abating noise, it need not be left to the legislature to introduce 
objective standards into the courts. During the 1970 SuRvEY year, in 
Aaron v. Los AngelesP• a California court determined that all resi-
dents living within certain defined areas adjacent to a municipal 
airport were entitled to recover damages for noise pollution. Those 
areas were delineated on the basis of Noise Exposure Forecast con-
tour levels which take into account decibel levels, intensity, and 
frequency of noise occurrence.26 The test for recovery was whether 
the individual's property lay within particular NEF contour levels. 
Similar standards could be utilized in determining the rights between 
parties in cases involving noise other than that caused by aircraft 
operation. In light of the technology available to the courts today, 
there is no reason to rely solely upon subjective tests formulated at a 
time when noise could not be measured objectively. 
The second category of actionable noise to be discussed- suits 
between private individuals and the government- can be divided 
into two distinct classes: first, suits by individuals against the govern-
ment, and second, suits by the government against individuals. In the 
first class, the common law theories of trespass and nuisance are de-
limited by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Essentially, the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity implies that private individuals must 
bear without compensation the damaging results of those actions 
which the government has deemed to be in the common interest.27 
25 Aaron v. Los Angeles, Civil No. 3877i9 (Sup. Ct. County of Los Angeles, 
Feb. 5, 1970), reported in Environmental Law Digest 7 (lst ed., Sept. 1970). As to 
municipal legislative efforts to prescribe and enforce altitude and antinoise levels, 
see Huard, The Roar, the Whine, the Boom, and the Law: Some Legal Concerns 
About the SST, 9 Santa Clara L. Rev. 189 (1969), 1 Environment L. Rev. 68, 84-90 
(1970). See also American Airlines v. Town of Hempstead, 272 F. Supp. 226 
(E.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1968); Allegheny Airlines v. Village of 
Cedarhurst, 132 F. Supp. 871 (E.D.N.Y. 1955), a[J'd, 238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1956); 
noted in 54 Mich. L. Rev. 998 (1956). 
26 Noise Exposure Forecast (NEF) contour levels are standards of noise measure-
ment developed by the acoustical engineering firm of Bolt, Beranek &: Newman 
and are presently accepted by the United States Department of Transportation 
and the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development. See 2 
Bolt, Beranek &: Newman, Acoustic Noise Control 148 (1952); Peterson &: Gross, 
Handbook of Noise Measurement (5th ed. 1963); Richards, The Control of Air-
craft Noise Perceived at Ground Level- Technical Aspects, 68 Royal Aeronautical 
Socy. 45 (1964); Burns, Noise and Man 10-51 (1968). On the legal aspects of air~ 
craft noise, see generally Hill, Liability for Aircraft Noise- The Aftermath 
of Causby and Griggs, 19 U. Miami L. Rev. 1 (1964); Note, Jet Noise in Airport 
Areas: A National Solution Required, 51 Minn. L. Rev. 1087 (1967). 
27 See Fuller &: Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation, 54 Harv. L 
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Certain limitations of the doctrine are considered by the courts in 
determining the respective rights of the individual and the govern-
ment: the activity must be sanctioned by law and the facility generat-
ing the noise must be designed and operated properly.2s Aside from 
trespass and nuisance, there is a third theory of action available to a 
private individual against the government, that is, an action for a 
"taking" of property. Although a particular noise sanctioned by the 
government may cause damage that is noncompensable because of the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity, where a taking by the government 
has occurred as the result of that noise, compensation may be granted 
since the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution require that a landowner be compensated for property 
that is taken for the public use by the government. Courts have ap-
plied the theory of a taking in cases involving noise pollution, es-
pecially where the noise has been the result of the operation of 
aircraft.29 In attempting to distinguish between a noncompensable 
"damaging" and a compensable "taking," courts have been forced 
to distinguish between "property" and "property rights." In con-
sidering the ownership of property, factors other than possessory are 
taken into account in order to make the necessary distinction. A 
substantial interference with property rights is sufficient to consti-
tute a taking for which compensation is due, and the landowner 
need not be displaced from his property in order to recover.so Even 
though the property owner retains actual physical possession of his 
land, he can recover where government-sanctioned activity substan-
tially interferes with his property rights.31 In Causby v. United 
States,32 where noise emanating from military aircraft was involved, 
the United States Supreme Court held that the low flights over the 
plaintiff's chicken farm constituted a taking for which the plaintiff 
should be compensated. In Griggs v. Allegheny County,ss the Court, 
in finding for the plaintiff against a municipal airport authority, 
extended the Causby doctrine to include the owner and operator of 
the airport on the basis that, in its decision to locate the airport and 
plan the runways, the authority did not acquire sufficient property 
for the approach areas, thereby causing the substantial interference 
Rev. 437 (1941). See also Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 
(1914), and cases cited supra note 4. 
28 Spater, Noise and the Law, 63 Mich. L. Rev. 1373, 1383 (1965). 
29 See note 3. It should be noted that in neither Causby nor Griggs was the 
taking based squarely upon the emission of objectionable and damaging noise; 
in both Supreme Court cases, effective displacements of the plaintiffs from their 
land were found. See also Martin v. Pon of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 324, 391 P.2d 
540 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965); Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 
Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962). 
so See United States v. Certain Parcels of Land in Kent County, Mich., 252 
F. Supp. 319 (W.D. Mich. 1966), and cases cited therein. 
31 Ibid. 
32 328 u.s. 256 {1946). 
38 369 u.s. 84 (1962). 
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with the plaintiff's property· rights. In both cases, the Supreme Court 
found a physical invasion of the plaintiff's property; subsequently, a 
physical invasion of the landowner's property was required in most 
jurisdictions in order to recover in an action brought upon a taking 
theory. In Bennett v. United States,a4 for instance, the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma found that the 
physical invasion of sonic shock waves of jet aircraft- the result of 
a test program designed to determine the potential effect of sonic 
booms caused by supersonic transport flights on ground structures 
and population centers beneath such flightpaths- was not sufficient 
to constitute a taking. In Bennett, the aircraft creating the sonic 
waves were flying within navigable air space six to nine miles above 
the ground when the sonic booms occurred. Citing Avery v. United 
States,35 the district court stated that "[p]hysical invasion of sound and 
shock waves of jet aircraft do not constitute a physical taking of 
property as opposed to a mere nuisance and trespass" and then held: 
There has been no taking of plaintiff's property in this case, 
and furthermore, the United States, in the absence of its consent, 
is immune from suit. All the flights involved in this case which 
caused the sonic booms were in navigable air space, and although 
the plaintiffs may have suffered because of the alleged nuisance 
and some inconvenience, such nuisance and inconvenience are 
incidental and unavoidably attendant to use of airways.36 
The defendant's motion for summary judgment was accordingly sus-
tained. 
The requirement of a physical invasion in taking cases is slowly 
being dispensed with in some jurisdictions. In at least four states hav-
ing provisions in their constitutions similar to the Fifth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution, the courts have eliminated the over-
flight requirement.37 Moreover, in United States v. Certain Parcels 
of Land in Kent County, Michigan,38 a condemnation proceeding, the 
United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan 
reasoned that the precedents of Causby and Griggs did not absolutely 
require physical invasion for recovery, and stated that 
... if (the interference] is so great as to constitute a wholly 
unreasonable and substantially destructive interference with the 
property involved, a taking will be found.39 
34 266 F. Supp. 627 (W.D. Okla. 1965). 
35 330 F.2d 640, 643 (Ct. Cl. 1964). 
36 266 F. Supp. 627, 630 (W.D. Okla. 1965). 
37 Henthorn v. Oklahoma City, 453 P.2d 1013 (Okla. 1969); Board of Educ. of 
Town of Morristown v. Palmer, 88 N.J. Super. 378, 212 A.2d 564 (Sup. Ct. App. 
Div. 1965); Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 324, 391 P.2d 540 (1964); Thorn-
burg v. Port of Oregon, 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962). 
38 252 F. Supp. 319 (W.D. Mich. 1966). 
39 Id. at 323. 
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In Massachusetts, however, the courts require a physical invasion 
and displacement in cases in which a taking is alleged.•o Although the 
physical invasion test is objective, it does not adequately deal with 
the problem of compensation for noise damage. There are other 
tests which, when used in ·combination, deal with the problem more 
equitably: diminution of value, balancing social gains against private 
losses, and private "harni·prevention" versus public "benefit-extrac-
tion."u 
The second class of suits involving private and governmental in-
terests- suits by the government against individuals- includes cases 
which the government brings against individuals either in a parens 
patriae capacity or as an enforcer of legislation. There has been no 
case in Massachusetts in which the state has brought an action in a 
parens patriae capacity for injuries caused by noise. Furthermore, 
existing legislation concerning the regulation of noise in the Com-
monwealth is plainly inadequate. What legislation there is deals 
mainly with motor vehicle noise emission,42 and those statutes are 
enforced infrequently. For the past two years, the Massachusetts legis-
lature has rejected legislation which would include noise as an element 
of "atmospheric pollution" as inclusively described in G.L., c. 111, 
§31C. Although the Massachusetts Department of Public Health has 
adopted several vague noise regulations, the Commonwealth has not 
attempted to enforce these regulations through the courts at this 
writing. The city of Boston has given the Boston Air Pollution Control 
Commission the authority to regulate noise in the city'3 and, pending 
the enactment of noise regulations by that commission, has adopted 
a noise abatement ordinance." The commission has dealt with 
problems of noise pollution administratively, but as it is presently in 
the process of formulating regulations, it has not proceeded in court. 
Because its authority emanates from the city and not the state, as far 
as noise regulation is concerned, the commission is limited to impos-
ing a fine of up to $50 a day for each violation of proposed noise regu-
lations, whereas it can impose a $500 fine and seek injunctive relief for 
air pollution violations.45 
The Federal Government has enacted noise abatement legislation 
in recent years which, if properly enforced, promises to be effective. 
Probably the most effective federal legislation is Title IV of the 
Clean Air Amendments,•a otherwise known as the Noise Pollution 
•o Sullivan v. Commonwealth, 3!15 Mass. 619, 142 N.E.2d 347 (1957). 
41 Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Founda-
tions of Just Compensation Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. II65 (1967). 
•2 G.L., c. 40, §21; id. c. 90, §§16-20. 
•s Boston, Mass., Ordinances c. !l (1970). 
"Ibid. . 
'5G.L, c. 111, §!llC. 
•s Pub. L. No. 91-&M, 84 Stat. 1676 et seq. (1970), amending Clean Air Act, 42 
U.S.C. §§1857 et seq. (Supp. V, 1970). 
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a_nd Abatement Act of 1970. The act essentially places noise pollu-
tiOn on an equal footing with air pollution. It gives the Environmental 
Protection Agency, established pursuant to Executive Reorganization 
Plan No. 3 of 1970,47 the authority to establish an Office of Noise 
Abatement and Control to study the problem of noise on a national 
level. The National Environmental Policy Act of 196948 established the 
Council on Environmental Quality and called for the participation 
of all federal agencies in promoting efforts to control pollution and 
to protect and enhance the environment. The act also provides for 
the submission of environmental impact statements on proposed 
projects which require federal action to the appropriate federal 
agencies; and public hearings are required, in certain circumstances, 
by guidelines promulgated pursuant to the act. The federal agencies, 
however, are not required to set final procedures for the implementa-
tion of the act until July, 1971, and there remains the question of 
when, namely, at what stage in the development of a particular project 
the environmental statement should be submitted and hearings be 
held. The Clean Air Amendments of 197049 also provide for a private 
right of action in the federal district courts based on emission stan-
dards or limitations under the act. It appears that, upon the com-
pletion of the study of the noise problem by the Office of Noise 
Abatement and Control, appropriate standards for noise emission will 
be adopted and a private right of action based on those standards will 
be available. A person will then be able to institute a suit against 
any individual, including the United States or any governmental 
instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the Eleventh 
Amendment of the United States Constitution, for violation of pre-
scribed noise emission standards, and against the administrator for 
not enforcing those standards. 
47 1970 Reorg. Plan No. 3, 35 Fed. Reg. 15623-15626 (1970). 
48 42 U.S.C. §§4321 et seq. (1964). In Hildebrand, Noise Poliution: An Intro-
duction to the Problem and an Outline for Future Legal Research, 70 Colum. L. 
Rev. 652, 674, 675 (1970), the author writes that "the new National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969 may have a revolutionary effect on projects affecting the en-
vironment .... This landmark legislation attempts to establish a national environ-
mental policy and an independent body of environmental advisors within the 
executive office of the President. Besides the important declaration of a national 
policy for a better environment, the Act requires agencies of the federal govern-
ment to consider environmental impact in deciding on project development, and 
gives the Council of Environmental Advisors surveillance over proposals. Oscar 
S. Gray, acting director of the Department of Transportation's Office of Environ-
mental and Urban Systems Research, has stated recently that among the factors 
to be evaluated in the early stages of highway planning will be such environ-
mental concerns as recreation, parks, aesthetics, neighborhood character, erosion, 
wildlife, noise, and air and water pollution [Boston Globe, Jan. 22, 1970, at 4, 
cols. 3-4]. It remains to be seen, however, if these federal guidelines will be 
followed on the state level." 
•9 Pub. L No. 91-604, 84 Stat~ 1676 (1970), amending Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§§1857 et seq. (Supp. V, 1970). 24
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Insofar as aircraft noise emission is concerned, the Clean Air 
Amendments of 1970 vest the Department of Transportation with 
the authority to prescribe and enforce regulations in this area, and in 
fact, the Department has adopted noise standards for new aircraft.5o 
The Department is also in the rule-making process of setting stan-
dards for retrofitting of existing aircraft and Vertical Short Take-off 
and Landing (VSTOL) aircraft. However, the secretary of that De-
partment has repeatedly spoken in favor of the development of the 
supersonic transport (SST), probably the noisiest aircraft yet con-
ceived.51 The Department has filed an environmental statement 
of the project in compliance with the National Environmental Policy 
Act of 1969, but the statement appears inadequate in that it fails to 
consider all of the implications of the project. Assuming that the 
SST becomes operative and violates future noise emission standards 
and that appropriate legislative action is taken to implement the 
Noise Pollution and Abatement Act of 1970, it is possible that a 
private right of action may lie for injuries resulting from the exces-
sive noise emissions of that aircraft. The Federal Government has 
already undertaken to regulate some types of noise emissions, and its 
authority appears to be extending to all types of noise pollution. One 
can only hope that the legislation needed to implement already exist-
ing legislation will be forthcoming to insure the proper regulation of 
noise pollution in our environment on a national level. 
The third and final category to be considered in discussing noise as 
it relates to the law is that which includes actions between govern-
ments and governmental agencies. On the federal level, the Clean 
Air Amendments of 1970 to the Clean Air Act,52 in addition to 
providing a federal right of action against individual violators of 
emission standards, also provide for the compliance of the Federal 
Government with all emission standards of Federal, state, and local 
governments, except where an exemption has been granted by the 
President. Since the Federal Government cannot sue itself, and since 
Section ll2(d)(l) of the 1970 act specifically provides that states can-
50 F.A.R. 36: Standards for New Aircraft. 
51 For a useful compilation of technical and nontechnical resources on the SST 
and the environmental problems which it promises, see Hildebrand, Noise Pollu-
tion: An Introduction to the Problem and an Outline for Future Legal Research, 
70 Colum. L. Rev. 652, 679-682. In view of recent developments, one might be 
tempted to use the past tense in considering problems posed by the SST. On 
March 24, 1971, the United States Senate followed similar House action of the 
previous week by voting 51-46 to terminate government funding of the SST de-
velopment program. While those apprehensive of the SST's potential damage to 
the environment have reason to be encouraged by the Congressional cut-off of 
direct appropriations, it should be noted that alternative means of private financing 
are being exph>red. As of this writing, it may be premature to sound the death 
knell of the SST. See Newsweek, Mar. 29, 1971, at 23-24; Boston Globe, Mar. 25, 
1971, at l, cols. 6-7 (morning ed.). 
52 Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970), amending Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§§1857 et seq. (Supp. V, 1970). 
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not enforce standards adopted pursuant to the act against stationary 
sources owned or operated by the United States, the power of en-
forcement of local standards against the Federal Government remains 
with the individual citizens of each state through the courts. Once 
noise standards are formulated under the act, the same prohibition 
against states suing the Federal Government will undoubtedly apply 
to individuals although it is assumed that the private right of action 
section will allow private suits to abate noise against the Federal 
Government. The prohibition will, of course, apply to the political 
subdivisions of a state, including municipalities. 
On the state and local level, there is currently pending in the United 
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit an appeal of a suit based 
on noise pollution brought by the city of Boston against the Massachu· 
setts Port Authority and nineteen airlines.53 The city ntaintains that 
the excessive noise emanating from the operation of L>gan Interna· 
tiona! Airport and low-flying aircraft has amounted to a nuisance, 
trespass, and taking as to fifteen schools owned and operated by the 
city in the East Boston section. The procedural issue of federal 
jurisdiction is still being litigated. The port authority has maintained 
that it is a state agency and therefore immune from suit under the 
Eleventh Amendment prohibition against a citizen's suing his own 
state, or subdivision of that state, in the federal courts. The city main-
tains that the authority is a quasi-public corporation so independent 
from the state that it is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment protec-
tion. In its complaint, the city alleged a violation of Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendment rights and of 42 U.S.C. §1983, and jurisdiction was 
invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§.1331, 1343(3) and 1343(4). The case 
was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, and that decision is currently 
being appealed by the city .of Boston. The case contains all of the 
problems involved in governments suing other governmental units in 
their own behalf on the federal level. 
Not only is there a problem of sovereign immunity but also the 
question of whether municipal governments enjoy constitutional 
protections which apply to citizens. Governments may sue other 
governments on common law theories such as trespass and nuisance 
where sovereign immunity does not apply, but whether a government 
can assert certain constitutional rights is still an issue. These prob-
lems will have to be resolved by specific legislation giving governments 
and governmental agencies the right to bring actions to enforce en-
vironmental standards against both the Federal Government and the 
state and local governments. Unless this is done, there can be no truly 
effective control of noise in our environment. 
liS City of Boston v. Massachusetts Port Authority,- F. Supp. -(D. Mass. 1971). 
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